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[L.A. No. 28980.

In Bank.

Oct. 30,1967.]

• ARTHUR E. HEMMERLING et al., Cross-complainants and
Appellants, v. TOMLEV, INC. et al., Cross-defendants
and Respondents.
[1] Easements-Appurtenant: Merger: Waters-Namre of Easement.-Where owners of different land holdings combined to
purchase a separate parcel and to share the cost of the installation 9f a well thereon to supply water to their respective
lands, the water right of each owner was an easement appurtenant to his own land separate from his eommon interest in
the fee of the parcel, and the fact that each party owned a fee
interest in both his scparate dominant estate and in the servient estate did not extinguish the easements by merger, for
the ownership interests in the two estates were not coextensive.
[2a, 2b] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Findings-Water Easements: Reversible Error.-On the extinguishment, by condemnation, of water easements that were appurtenant to separate
dominant estates and usable only to provide water for their
irrigation, the value of each easement, for which each eondemnee was entitled to be compensated, was the diminution in
market value of the dominant tenement caused by the loss of
the easement, and it was reversible error in such a case for the

C)

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Easements, § 41; Am.Jur.2d, Easements,
S108.
McR.Dig. References: [1] Easements, §§ 5, 45; Waters, § 236;
[2] Eminent Domain, §§ 164, 182; Easements, § 62; Waters, § 260;
[3] Trial, § 337(4); [4] Eminent Domain, § 78; Waters, § 259;
[6] Eminent Domain, § 89; [6] Eminent Domain, § 76.

;j
]\ .

.\~I~.
.
.'

'

, 'II
"\

, :1
.~

i

.J

-Reporter '. Note: This case wns previously entitled, "Pe9ple ell: reI.
Department of Public Works v. Hemmerling."

Oct. 1967]

)

[3]

[4:]

[6]

t.-J-'
'[6]

---.

HEMMERLING

1).

TOMLEV. INC.

[67 C.2d 572; 63 Cal.Rptr. 1. 4J2 P.2d 697]

573

trial court not to make an express finding on the assessed
value of one of the easements separately from the value of the
fee interest in the condemned well site, where the condemnees
concerned had specifically requested a finding on that issue
and had introduced substantial evidence as to the easement's
value to support a finding in their favor.
Trial - Finding Ultimate Facts - When Findings Cannot Be
Implied.-In a proceeding in eminent domain in which the
trial court made no express finding on the value of a water
easement extinguished by the condemnation, Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 634, precluded, on appeal, an inferred finding adverse to the
condemnees' contentions on such value, where they had made a
written request for a specific finding on that crucial issue.
Eminent Doma.in-Compensation-Evidence as to DamagesValue of Water Easement.-On the issue of the value of a
water easement, servient to a dominant estate until extinguished by the condemnation of the site of the water source,
_the condemnees' testimony of the increased cost of procuring
water elsewhere was relevant as concerning an element which
a reasonable person would consider in arriving at the final test
of difference in fair market value.
Id.-CompensatioD-Evidence as to Damages-Opinion Evidence.-Although the owner of property is competent to testify to its value, the trial court is not bound by the opinions
of the witnesses on market value. The province of such testimony is only to aid the court in arriving at a conclusion.
Id. - Compensation - Water Easement. - On the extinguishment of water easements through the condemnation of a
1,000-square-foot well site supplying water to separate dominant estates in the vicinity, the condemnees were entitled to
compensation for the value of the site and of the easements,
but not for severance damages, where, although the site was
the source of the water, the condemnees' fee interest in the
site itself cont.ributed nothing to the enjoyment of the estates
retained.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior court of Orange
County. Warren J. Ferguson, Judge. Reversed.
Cross-complaint for a larger share of a condemnation
~ward apportioned for well site taken in an eminent domain
proceeding. Judgment of condemnation apportioning dam[6] Unity or contiguity of properties essential to allowance of
damages in eminent domain proceedings on account of remaining
property, note, 6 A.L.R.2d 1197. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Eminent
Domain, § 108; Am.Jur.2d, Eminent Domain, § 315.
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ages reversed as to valuation of cross-complainant's water - --easement.
Richards, Watson & Hemmerling, Clifford A. Hemmerling
and Ronald M. Greenberg for Cross-complainants and Appellants.
Baird, Holley, Baird & Galen, James Michael Welch and
Leonard B. Hankins for Cross-defendants and Respondents.
Harry S. Fenton, R. B. Pegram, Richard L. Franck, Charles
E. Spencer, Jr., and Robert W. Vidor as Amici CUriae.
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TRA YNOR, C. J.-This action involves the condemnation
of approximately 1,000 square feet of land (parcel 4) located
('ast of Anaheim in Orange County. The parcel was owned in
undivided interests by defendants Arthur E. Hemmerling and
Hulda M. Hemmerling, a group of corpo~ations, and Holly
Wade Davidson. The Hemmerlin~s appeal from the judgment
apportioning the condemnation award.
Parcel 4 was owned in common by defendants subject to an
agreement executed by them or their predecessors in interest
on Fe~ruary 5, 1926. All of the parties to the agreement
individually owned other land in the vicinity of parcel 4. The
1926 agreement provided for thE' formation of a voluntary,
llonprofit association whose members would be the owners of
parcel 4. The association's purpose was to construct and operate a water well and pumping plant on parcel 4 and an irrigation pipeline system from the well to the lands of the members. The agreement set forth the interests of the parties in
parcel 4 and provided that each party should share in the
costs of installation and maintenance of the well and plant in
the proportion of his acreage to the total acreage of all the
members. A 1939 amendment provided that the interests of
the parties in the water system were appurtenant to their
respective separately owned lands. Any party could elect not
to take his share of water, and during any period he so
I'Iected, he would not be obligated to pay any of the costs of
operating the system.
Before the condemnation action was commenced, both the
corporations and Davidson elected not to take water from the
system until further notice. At the time of the trial their
lands were being used for industrial purposes, and no likelihood appears that they will again be used for purposes requiring irrigation. The Hemmerlings, however, continued to take
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water from the system until the time of trial and were the
only owners using water on the date of the filing of the complaint.
In condemning parcel 4 for freeway purposes plaintiff
f'lected to proceed under section 1246.1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides that the total amount of the award
for the property is to be first determined as between the plaintiff and all defendants and then apportioned among the
defendants in further proceedings.
The parties stipulated I t that the total compensation to be
paid for the taking of parcel 4 and all interests therein, is the
sum of $9,450" and waived findings on this issue. After the
trial on the issue of apportionment the court found that the
Hemmerlings, the corporations, and Davidson were entitled to
share in the award in the proportion that the separate acreage
of each bore to the total of their combined separate acreage.
The Hemmerlin~ contend that the trial court erred in faillng to value the water easement of each party separately from
his respective fee interests in parcel 4 (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1248) and in failing to make a finding on the issue of Severance damages. They also assert that the trial court eqed in
disregarding their valuation evidence since it was uncontra(licted and unimpeached.
[1] The water right of each party to the 1926 agreement
was an easement appurtenant to his own land separate from
his interest in common with the other parties in the fee of
parcel 4. The fact that each party owned a fee interest in both
his separate dominant estate and in the servient estate did not
extinguish the easements by merger, for the ownership interests in the two estates were not coextensive. (Ch6da v. Bodkin
(1916) 173 Cal. 7, 17 [158 P. 1025]; see Porto v. Vosti (1955)
136 CaI.App.2d 395, 397 [288 P.2d 618].)
[20.] Since the condemnation of parcel 4 extinguished the
easements, defendants were entitled to compensation for
them. When, as in this case, the easements are appurtenant
and can be used only to provide water for irrigation of the
dominant estates, the value of each easement is the diminution
in the market value of the dominant tenement caused by its
loss. (People ex reI. Dept. of Public Works v. Logrm (1961)
398 CalApp.2d 581, 586 [17 Cal.Rptr. 674], and cases cited;
see Jahr, Eminent Domain (1957) § 160; 4 Nichols, Easement
(3d ed. 1962) § 12.41; 1 Orgel, Valuation Under the Law of
Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1953) § 111, at p. 476, fn. 36; cf.
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United States v. 4.105 Acres of Land in P1.easanto-n, (N.D.
Cal. 1946) 68 F.Supp. 279, 292.)
Section 1248, subdivision 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure
provides that the court must assess the «, value of the property
sought to be condemned, . . . and of each and every separate
t'state therein; . . . " Accordingly, the trial court should
Jlave assessed the values of the easements separately from thc
values of the respective fee interests in parcel 4. It dOES not
appear from the findings of fact and conclusions of law th~t __
the trial court did so. [8] Moreover, we may not infer a finding adverse to the Hemmerlings on the value of their ~
ment, for they "made a written request for a specific finding" on that issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 634; Culbertso-n v.
C'izek (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 451, 465 [37 Cal.Rptr. 548];
Mock v. Shulman (1964) 226 Ca1.App.2d 263, 268 [38 Cal.
Rptr. 39].) They requested that the court appraise the fair
market· value of their appurtenant right to use water at
$9,000. This request was not one for a finding of an evidentiary fact (see South Santa Clara Water etc. Did. v. Johnslm
(1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 388, 404-405 [41 Cal.Rptr. 846]), but
for a finding of an ultimate fact on a crucial issue. [2b] Under section 634 the trial court was not at liberty to disre~
gard the request to make a finding on that issue because it.
disagreed with the Hemmerlings as to what that finding'
should be.
The failure of the trial court to make any finding on the value
of the Hemmerlings' water right is reversible 'error, for they
introduced substantial evidence fu support a finding in their
favor. (Parker v. Shell Oil Co. (1946) 29 Ca1.2d 503, 512 [175
P.2d 838] ; Sam Jose etc. Title In:r. Co. v. Elliott (1952) 108
Cal.App.2d 793,801 [240 P.2d 41].) [4] Arthur Hemmerling
testified that the value of the pumping plant and well site was
$450, that the value of his water right was $9,000, and that it
would be substantially more expensive for him to procure
water elsewhere. Although his testimony was not expressed in
the form of an opinion that his separate property had diminished in value by the sum of $9,000, there is no indication
that he used any other method to reach this figure. His testimony as to the increased cost of water was relevant to that
issue since it is one of the ,« elements which a reasonable person would consider in arriving at the final test of difference in
fair market value. . . ." (City of Rit1erside v. Kraft (1962)
203 Cal.App.2d 300, 304 [21 Cal.Rptr. 425] ; County of Santa
Clara. v. Curtner (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 730, 744 [54 Cal.
Rptr.257].)
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We cannot agree, however, with the Hemmerlings' contention that the trial court was bound to accept their uncontradicted valuation testimony. [5] Although the owner of
property is competent to testify to its value (City of Gilroy v.
Filice (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 259,268 [34 Cal.Rptr. 368]),
"The trial court is not bound by the opinions of the witnesses on market value . . . . [T]he province of such testimony is only to aid the court in arriving at a conclusion."
(Joint Highway Dist. No.9 v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co. (1933)
128 Cal.App. 743, 762 [18 P.2d 413].)
The Hemmerlings contend that the rejection of their evidence would necessitate the inherently improbable conclusions
that the water easements were worth nothing and therefore
that plaintiff was willing to pay $9,450 for 1,000 square feet
of land or approximately $400,000 an acre. It would not follow, however, from a rejection of the Hemmerlings' evidence
that the water easements were valueless. The trial court may
have been of the view that all of the parties lost valuable
water rights. The fact that the other condemnees were not
using the irrigation system at the time of the condemnation
does not establish that they were not damaged by the loss, for
it may nevertheless have diminished the market 'Talue of their
lands.
[6] For the purposes of retrial we point out that none of
the parties is entitled to severance damages. In addition to
other requirements, such damages can only be -allowed when
there is unity of use between the parcel conden~.ned and the
parcel retained. There was no such connection of us~ between
the fee interests in parcel 4 and the dominant tenements" 'as
to make the enjoyment of the parcel taken reasonably and
substantially necessary to the enjoyment of the parcels
left, . . . '" (City of Stockton v. Marengo (1934) 137 Cal.
App. 760, 766 [31 P.2d467] ; Ciiy of Menlo Pa'rk v. Artino
(1957) 151 CaI.App.2d 261, 270 [311 P.2d 135].) The parties'
fee interests in parcel 4 contributed nothing to the enjoyment
of the remaining parcels. Although their water rights had
their source in parcel 4, those water rights were separately
owned easements, and the parties will be fully compensated
by payment of the value of parcel 4 and those easements.
The judgment is reversed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
and Sullivan, J., concurred.
67 C.2d-18

